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The “empty” Cartesian subject ($) is not just the agent of abstraction 
(tearing apart what in reality belongs together), it is itself an abstraction, 
i.e., it emerges as the result of the process of abstraction, of self-
withdrawal from its real-life context. This is why the “materialist” demand 
to localize a subject into the texture of its “concrete” historical situation 
misses the key point: what disappears if we do it? – is the subject itself. 
And, again, this does not mean that subject is a kind of user’s illusion 
which persists only insofar as it doesn’t know fully its concrete material 
conditions: the network of “concrete material conditions” is in itself 
incomplete, it contains cracks and inconsistencies which are the points of 
the rise of subjects.  
In his detailed reading of Schubert’s Winterreise, Ian Bostridge1 
deploys the implications of the fact that, as we learn in the very first lines 
of the first song, the narrator both comes to and leaves the house as a 
stranger. We never learn the reason why he leaves: was he thrown out by 
the prohibitive father of the family, was he rejected by the girl, did he 
escape out of fear of marriage promulgated by the girl’s mother? This 
vagueness which creates anxiety is a positive feature in itself: it positively 
defines the narrator as a kind of empty place between parentheses, as a 
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barred subject in the Lacanian sense of $. This emptiness is constitutive 
of the subject, it comes first, it is not the result of a process of abstraction 
or alienation: the barred/empty subject is not abstracted from the 
“concrete” individual or person fully embedded in its life-world, this 
abstraction/withdrawal from all substantial content constitutes it. The 
“fullness of a person,” its “inner wealth,” is what Lacan calls the 
fantasmatic “stuff of the I,” imaginary formations which fill in the void that 
“is” subject. Here also enters what Lacan calls objet a : objet a (as the 
stand-in for a lack) is the objectal correlate of the empty subject, that 
which causes anxiety. Back to Winterreise : objet a of the narrator is not 
the secret true reason why he had to leave the house, it is the very 
cause/agent of the narrator’s “emptying” into a stranger whose true 
motivations are obscure and impenetrable. As such, objet a is the object 
which would have been lost the moment we were to learn the “true” 
particular cause of why the narrator left the house. 
 The abstraction enacted by subject is not the end result, it is the 
point of passage to a new concretion. There is a passage in Proust’s 
Recherche in which Marcel uses the telephone for the first time, speaking 
to his grandmother; her voice, heard alone, apart from her body, surprised 
him – it is a voice of a frail old woman, not the voice of the grandmother 
he remembers. And the point is that this experience of the voice isolated 
from its context colors Marcel’s entire perception of the grandmother: 
when, later, he visits her in person, he perceives her in a new way, as a 
strange mad old woman drowsing over her book, overburdened with age, 
flushed and course, no longer the charming and caring grandmother he 
remembered. This is how voice as autonomous partial object can affect 
our entire perception of the body to which it belongs. The lesson of it is 
that, precisely, the direct experience of the unity of a body, where voice 
seems to fit its organic whole, involves a necessary mystification; in order 
to penetrate to the truth, one has to tear this unity apart, to focus onto one 
of its aspects in its isolation, and then to allow this element to color our 
entire perception. Such a “re-totalization”, based on violent abstraction, is 
what we should call “concrete abstraction”: abstraction which grounds its 
own concrete totality. 
Another case of violent re-totalization is provided by movie actors 
who are as a rule identified with a certain screen persona: neither the 
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character(s) they play in a film nor what they really are as private “real” 
persons but a certain personality that transpires through multiple roles as 
the “type” an actor is playing again and again. Humphrey Bogart was 
playing the same cynical and wounded but honest character, Gary 
Cooper played the same terse and abrupt courageous type, Cary Grant 
played the same hectic hyper-active type, etc. There is, however, usually 
in their career at least one film in which they play a type running against 
their screen persona. Henry Fonda continuously played a strictly honest 
and highly moral character, but late in his career, he made an exception – 
he decided to play the main bad guy, a brutal sadistic killer working for 
the rail company in Sergio Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West. The 
interesting thing is how this role (and Fonda plays it with obvious 
pleasure!) retroactively changed our perception of his standard screen 
persona and enabled us, spectators, to perceive cracks in it – say, to 
discern traces of brutality and arrogance in the way he played the great 
heroic figures from Abraham Lincoln to Colonel Thursday in John Ford’s 
Fort Apache who causes a massacre of his soldiers when he leads them 
to a hasty attack. 
Or let us take Ben Kingsley; the role that defined his screen persona 
was that of Gandhi in Attenborough’s rather boring “masterpiece” – a dull 
and preaching agent of justice, equality and Indian independence. 
However, 18 years later, Kingsley excelled in Sexy Beast where he plays a 
brutal mob enforcer bursting with evil wit and irony. So, perhaps, the fact 
that the two big movie roles of Ben Kingsley are Gandhi and the 
ridiculously-aggressive English gangster do bear witness to a deeper 
affinity: what if the second character is the full actualization of the hidden 
potentials of the first one? If we look back at Gandhi from this standpoint, 
we are forced to bring out the weird and very problematic features of his 
character ignored by the media hagiography… (There is another role 
played by Kingsley which breaks out of this duality and moves to a totally 
different dimension: in the 1988 TV drama Lenin: The Train, Kingsley gives 
a very sympathetic portrayal of Lenin on his legendary train voyage from 
Zurich to Petersburg in the Spring of 1917, with Dominique Sanda as 
Inessa Aemand and the old Leslie Caron as Nadhezda Krupskaya.) 
  Our last example in these series is Tom Cruise. His exception – the 
exception to his standard screen persona – is what I consider by far his 
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best role, that of Frank Mackey, a motivational speaker peddling a pick-up 
artist course to men, in P.T. Anderson’s Magnolia.  What is so striking is 
the obvious pleasure with which he plays this extremely repulsive 
character; an extrovert, hard-talking guy who teaches his pupils how it is 
all about fucking women and how to dominate them. (Later in the film his 
character gains some complexity, but what we get is just the twisted 
inner life of a vulgar corrupted person.) Again, of we look back at his other 
roles from this vantage point, we can easily discern the immanent 
vulgarity of his screen persona which transpires even in his “socially-
critical” roles like that of playing the anti-war activist Ron Kovic in Oliver 
Stone’s movie adaptation of Kovic's memoir, Born on the Fourth of July. 
We can perceive the vacuity of his arrogant sarcasms in The Color of 
Money or in A Few Good Men, the vain pretentiousness of Vanilla Sky, up 
to the flat and unconvincing heroism of his Stauffenberg in Valkyrie. The 
point is not that this is his “real person” but that it is the reality beneath his 
screen persona. In short, the old Marxist and Freudian rule holds here 
also: the exception is the only way to universal truth.    
But the great writer of abstraction is Samuel Beckett, and to a 
partisan of the standard Marxist concrete historical analysis of the works 
of art in the style of Lukacs, the way he practices abstraction in his work 
cannot but appear as resolutely “anti-Marxist.” When he depicts the 
subjective experience of terror, loss, suffering and persecution, he does 
not endeavour to locate it into a concrete historical context (say, making it 
clear that it is a moment of Fascist terror in an occupied country, or of the 
Stalinist terror against dissident intellectuals). Beckett does (almost – not 
quite, of course) the exact contrary: he puts particular forms of terror and 
persecution which belong to different contexts and levels (Fascist terror, 
the “terror” of anti-Fascist revenge, administrative “terror” of regulating the 
repatriation of refugees and prisoners) into a series and blurs their 
distinctions, constructing an abstract form of de-contextualized terror, one 
can even say: a Platonic Idea of terror. Why this? Shouldn’t we locate 
every terror into its concrete historical situation and distinguish between 
Fascist terror, authentic revolutionary terror, Stalinist terror, consumerist 
terror, etc.? Why is Beckett’s abstraction from concrete social context not 
only psychologically (a victim experiences his situation as abstract), but 
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also ontologically, with regard to social totality itself, more truthful than a 
“concrete” realist image of social totality?  
Let’s take a closer look at how Beckett proceeds. He does not 
simply erase echoes of historical reality – abstraction is in his writing a 
process, not a state. As Emilie Morin perspicuously noticed, 
on the surface, there is little about his destitute characters that 
might suggest an aspiration to political theorising or political action. 
And yet they partially function as political metonymies: the political 
order to which they belong, sketched in the shadows and recesses 
of the texts, materialises precisely as they struggle through ruins, 
mud, deserted landscapes, empty rooms and other residues of a 
historical horror escaping categorisation.2 
Becket often is the exemplary apolitical writer, dealing with basic 
existential deadlocks and dilemmas. However, a close reading of his 
works makes it clear that Beckett’s entire opus is impregnated by (traces 
of and echoes to) political events: the political turmoil in Ireland around 
1930, the struggle between Fascism and anti-Fascism through the 1930s, 
Resistance against Fascist occupation, the struggle for Black 
emancipation against apartheid (his only financial donation to a political 
party was to ANC), the Algerian war of independence (apropos the 
French colonial war in Algeria, he coined the term “Murderous 
Humanitarianism” in order to designate the truth of the French “civilizing” 
colonialism), the Vietnam war, Palestinian resistance, the defence of 
persecuted writers… all is there, but not directly (“realistically”) 
represented.  
A gap persists between the two levels perfectly rendered by 
Beckett who wrote: “The material of experience is not the material of 
expression.” The “material of experience” are the historical data, social 
events; the “material of expression” is the universe depicted in Beckett’s 
world; and the passage from one to the other is abstraction. It is in this 
precise sense that Beckett called for “an art of empêchement 
(impediment or hindrance), a state of deprivation that is material and 
ontological in equal measure”3: an invisible obstacle renders impossible 
the continuous transition from abstract experience to concrete social 
totality. This obstacle acts like the Lacanian Real/Impossible which 
makes reality (the reality of social totality, in this case) incomplete, 
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cracked. The persisting unfreedom, uneasiness, and dislocation in a 
modern formally “free” society can be properly articulated, brought to 
light, only in an art which is no longer constrained to the “realist” 
representative model. The modern uneasiness, unfreedom in the very 
form of formal freedom, servitude in the very form of autonomy, and, 
more fundamentally, anxiety and perplexity caused by that very 
autonomy, reaches so deep into the very ontological foundations of our 
being that it can be expressed only in an art form which destabilizes and 
denaturalizes the most elementary coordinates of our sense of reality. 
 Perhaps the exemplary case of Beckett’s procedure of abstraction 
is his Malone Dies whose entire topic and details clearly relate to the 
French peripeties during the German occupation and its aftermath: the 
Nazi and collaborationist control, terror and oppression, the revenge 
against collaborationists and the way refugees were treated when 
returning home and recuperating. What gives such a power to the novel 
is precisely that these three domains are condensed into a single 
suffocating experience of an individual lost in the web of police, 
psychiatric and administrative measures. However, Beckett’s procedure 
of abstraction reaches its peak in his two late short theatre masterpieces, 
Not I and Catastrophe. In Not I, a twenty-minute dramatic monologue 
from 1972, there are no “persons” here, intersubjectivity is reduced to its 
most elementary skeleton, that of the speaker (who is not a person, but a 
partial object, a faceless MOUTH speaking — an “organ without a body,” 
as it were) and AUDITOR, a witness of the monologue who says nothing 
throughout the play; all the Auditor does is that, in “a gesture of helpless 
compassion” (Beckett), he four times repeats the gesture of simple 
sideways raising of arms from sides and their falling back. The basic 
constellation of the play is thus the dialogue between the subject and the 
big Other, where this couple is reduced to its barest minimum: the Other 
is a silent impotent witness which fails in its effort to serve as the medium 
of the Truth of what is said, and the speaking subject itself is deprived of 
its dignified status of “person” and reduced to a partial object. 
 Catastrophe (1982), a late short play which may appear to violate 
his rules, is a “realist” play staging the rehearsal of a theatre play of the 
brutal interrogation of a nameless prisoner, and it shamelessly relies on a 
parallel between oppressive interrogation and the ruthless domination of 
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a theatre director over his actors in rehearsing a play. Catastrophe can 
thus be read “as a solipsistic reflection upon the dispossessed body; as a 
rumination on the mechanics of theatrical spectacle; as an exposition of 
the tyranny practised by Soviet Communism; as an examination of the 
enduring power of dissent in the face of oppression.”4 All these disparate 
levels are condensed into one, the Idea of the mechanics of oppression, 
and the ambiguity affects even the conclusion:  
The play can be viewed as an allegory on the power 
of totalitarianism and the struggle to oppose it, the protagonist 
representing people ruled by dictators (the director and his aide). 
By ‘tweak[ing] him until his clothing and posture project the 
required image of pitiful dejectedness,’ they exert their control over 
the silenced figure. ‘The Director’s reifying of the Protagonist can be 
seen as an attempt to reduce a living human being to the status of 
an icon of impotent suffering. But, at the end of the play, he 
reasserts his humanity and his individuality in a single, vestigial, yet 
compelling movement’5 – in an act of defiance, the man looks up 
into the audience (after having been looking down the entire 
time). In answer to a reviewer who claimed that the ending was 
ambiguous Beckett replied angrily: ‘There’s no ambiguity there at 
all. He’s saying, you bastards, you haven’t finished me yet.’6  
In short, he is making Beckett’s standard point of persisting in resistance: 
“Try again. Fail again. Fail better.” However, what we should bear in mind 
here is that, in this case, the “bastards” are also members of the public 
that enjoys the show, and “you haven’t finished me yet” also means: I will 
not resign myself to play the suffering victim in order to satisfy your 
humanitarian needs. Although Beckett dutifully signed petitions in 
solidarity with the artists persecuted in “totalitarian” (mostly Communist) 
countries, he was also aware of “what becomes of solidarity under the 
imperative to transform suffering into spectacle. The play offers a rebuke 
to the expectations of an imagined audience attending a charity event, 
awaiting a predicted performance of hardship in exchange for its 
donation.” Catastrophe was first performed precisely as part of such a 
public spectacle of solidarity with Vaclav Havel (imprisoned in 
Czechoslovakia), so that when, in the play’s very last moment, the 
victimized Protagonist raises his head and takes a direct look at the 
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audience, this gesture should definitely be read also as addressing the 
public with a message like “don’t think you are much better than what is 
portrayed in my short play, the anonymous prosecutor terrorizing the 
Protagonist, and the theatre director terrorizing the actor – you are part of 
the same hypocritical game, enjoying the spectacle of suffering which 
makes you feel good in your solidarity with the victim.” This is the art of 
abstraction, of reduction to form, at its most radical, brought to the self-
referential extreme: with regard to content, it slides metonymically from 
the terror of totalitarian interrogation to the terror exerted by theatre 
directors on performers, and from there to the terror exerted by the 
benevolent humanitarian public on the theatre ensemble itself. Nobody is 
simply innocent, nobody is totally exempted. 
 The circle is thus (almost) closed: humanitarian charity participates 
in the universe which creates victims; eco-sustainability reproduces the 
very ecological problems it claims to resolve; reforms of capitalism make 
it more efficient… The circle is ALMOST closed: it is impossible to break 
out of it, which means one can do it by means of a real-impossible act. 
Such an act can assume many forms, up to the renunciation to act. A 
friend of mine was in analysis with a big Lacanian figure, and his analysis 
was over when he decided that he didn’t want to change but would 
prefer to remain the same as he is. This rejection of change was, of 
course, the most radical existential change, since prior to this decision, 
his entire existence was under the shadow of a need to change.  
So, what is to be done in the Beckettian situation that is ours today, 
in a situation in which the future is obscure and impenetrable and we can 
rely on no prospect of progress in the way classic Marxism still did? 
Although things are changing today in a breath-taking rhythm (in ecology, 
economy, sciences…), nobody really knows where will all this lead us. 
Maybe, Lenin can unexpectedly serve as our guide here. Two years 
before his death, when it became clear that there will be no all-European 
revolution, and that the idea of building socialism in one country was 
nonsense, he wrote: 
What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating 
the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold, offered us the 
opportunity to create the fundamental requisites of civilization in a 
different way from that of the West European countries?"7 
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The basic ideological operation of Stalin was precisely to turn around 
Lenin’s reading of the situation: he presented the fact that Soviet Union 
remained alone as a unique chance to build socialism in one country. In 
that historical situation, Stalin’s formula was one of hope; however, the 
next decade made evident the price paid for the attempt to live up to this 
hope: purges, mass starvation, etc. Today’s Left finds itself in a situation 
described by Lenin: no predetermined “historical task” is waiting for us, or, 
more precisely, the realization of this Big Task has miserably failed, but 
this very situation gives us a weird kind of freedom – we can improvise, 
although under the shadow of the impossibility to achieve the Big Goal. 
And we should make a step further here: what if this is not an exception 
(as it may have appeared in the case of Russia where revolution occurred 
at a wrong place and time) but the rule: what if the true revolutionary 
change can take place only in the aftermath of the failed Big Revolution? 
This is how we can and should act in the Hegelian historical moment 
when the End already took place and we live in its confused aftermath. 
 
1 See Ian Bostridge, Schubert’s Winter Journey, London: Faber and Faber 2015.  
2 Emilie Morin, Beckett’s Political Imagination, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2017, p. 3. 
3 Morin, op.cit., p. 239. 
4 Op.cit., p. 243. 
5 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett, London: Bloomsbury 
1996, p 679. 
6 Quoted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastrophe_(play). 
7 V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, Moscow: Progress Publishers 1966, p. 479. 
                                                     
